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Forced migration is defined as "movements of refugees and internally 
displaced people (those displaced by conflicts) as well as people displaced by 
natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or 
development projects."  
(International Association for the Study of Forced Migration, IASFM) 
 
I. Introduction 
At the end of 2017, more than 65 million people were displaced from their home regions 
due to interstate wars, civil conflicts, and natural disasters (UNHCR, 2018). Collectively 
these migrants are considered forced migrants. Forced migration is as common today (e.g. 
Syrian civil war refugees, Rohingya expelled from Myanmar) as it was in history (e.g. mass 
population movements after WWII) and is a world-wide phenomenon. With climate change, 
forced migration as a result of natural disasters is even bound to increase.1 
The counterfactual to forced migration can be death, violence, perceived threats of 
bodily harm, psychological distress, or severe economic loss (e.g. destruction or 
expropriation of property). Forced migration has potential consequences for host populations, 
migrants themselves, and for the populations at origin.  
A brief taxonomy of forced migration 
Episodes of forced migration display substantial variation in scale: conflicts or natural 
disasters can affect small groups in the case of selective expulsions along ethnic, racial or 
religious lines, or can take the form of mass expulsions of millions of individuals. Most of the 
cases of forced migration studied over the last decade look at rather massive migration flows 
that are rarely found in peace times.2 Also natural disasters, such as volcano eruptions and 
floods, can trigger migration flows and display consequences similar to those from civil wars 
or war evictions. 
Forced migration may be temporary, such as when refugees find a transitory abode in a 
safe country while waiting to return to their home countries, or permanent, as in the case of 
forced population movements after WWII when European borders were redrawn. 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Marchiori et al. (2012), Beine and Parsons (2015), and Cattaneo and Peri (2016). 
2 Migration waves that were largely voluntary in nature and have attracted considerable interest are, for 
instance, the U.S. Age of Mass migration in 1850-1914 (see e.g. Abramitzky et al., 2014, and Sequeira et al., 
2018) or, more recently, migration of Eastern Europeans to the UK following EU enlargement in 2004 (see e.g. 
Bell et al., 2013). 
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Forced migration can have consequences different from voluntary migration, both for 
populations at destination and origin, but also for the migrants themselves. While voluntary 
migration is likely to follow economic cost-benefit considerations of the migrants, 
involuntary migration is the result of forces outside the control of the migrants.3,4 
However, it is important to note that the distinction between voluntary and forced 
migration is by no means a binary one.5 One can well argue that cross-country mobility 
within the EU is all voluntary, and that wholesale expulsion of populations resulting from 
border changes in the wake of World War II was forced and virtually universal. But there are 
intermediate cases, e.g. in the case of civil wars, where the perceived level of threat varies 
across individuals. Surely, migration in times of civil wars is not voluntary, but to the extent 
that not all individuals in localities affected by a civil war do migrate, some papers explicitly 
model migration as a choice in the face of perceived threats (e.g. Engel and Ibañez, 2007; 
Ibañez and Velez, 2008). Still, not moving comes with a high risk of continued repression, 
threats or even death. 
Identification 
A typical concern for econometric analyses in the migration literature are issues of 
endogeneity. This includes omitted variables, reverse causality, or selection issues, among 
others. When studying the impact of migration on natives’ wages, for instance, any potential 
negative effects due to increased competition might be underestimated because migrants self-
selected into moving to the most prosperous regions which could more easily accommodate 
more workers without harming natives. Likewise, the most affected natives might have left 
areas with the largest immigrant inflows to avoid increased competition. Selective in- and 
out-migration of different groups due to unobserved factors therefore can significantly 
confound such relationships. 
From an identification point of view, most episodes of forced migration are considered 
“exogenous” for receiving populations and migrants alike, and its consequences on various 
outcomes are typically interpreted as causal effects.6 This is because most receiving countries 
                                                 
3 Some of the terms in the literature associated with forced migration are as follows: refugees, 
displacement/displaced, expulsion/expellees, exiles. Voluntary migrants are often called economic migrants.  
4 From the perspective of host populations, also the scale of immigration as a result of forced migration 
elsewhere is sometimes outside their control, conditional on the host country welcoming refugees. For instance, 
the German government may have under-estimated the inflow of Syrians into Germany after 2015, after Angela 
Merkel’s welcome to Syrian refugees. 
5 See also Dustmann et al. (2017) for a discussion of differences between refugees and economic migrants in 
their work on refugee waves and policy in the EU since the 1980s. 
6 Migration lotteries are a rare alternative to convincingly identify causal effects of migration on migrants 
themselves. See Gibson et al. (2018) for one example and further references. 
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allocate refugees across space according to pre-determined rules while restricting the 
mobility of refugees. The allocation of refugees in Germany, for example, follows the so-
called Königsteiner Schlüssel, an administrative rule which distributes new arrivals across 
federal states based on state tax revenues and population.7 Refugees are not allowed to move 
until their refugee status is formally acknowledged, a process that can take several years. 
Studies of cases where such allocation mechanisms are non-existent or imperfect 
typically employ quasi-experimental methods instead. Examples of such methods include 
difference-in-differences, where identification comes from parallel pre-trends in the 
outcomes between units that did or did not experience the inflow of refugees, or generalized 
difference-in-differences where there is variation in the intensity of the inflow (e.g. Tumen, 
2016; Kreibaum, 2016). Others have used spatial regression-discontinuity designs exploiting 
location patterns of forced migrants either at destination (e.g. Schumann, 2014) or at source 
(e.g. Testa, 2018). When forced migrants have some control over their location choice, such 
as internally displaced persons, other work has used instrumental variables regressions. The 
distance to geographically available border crossings (Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015; 
Akgündüz et al., 2018), pre-existing networks of the affected migrant group in the receiving 
area (Morales, 2018), or the degree of violence in migrants’ home region (Calderón-Mejía 
and Ibáñez, 2016) have been used to generate plausibly exogenous variation in the inflow 
shares of refugees. 
The literature on the consequences of migration for receiving populations often does not 
distinguish between forced and voluntary migrants, even though the two groups of migrants 
may be quite different, as Cortes (2004) and Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2018) pointed out. 
Assimilation 
The migration literature routinely looks at first and second-generation immigrants to 
analyse assimilation with the host population. Both forced and voluntary migrants share the 
experience of having to adjust to a new environment. However, forced migration is likely to 
be a distinct experience for the migrants themselves. It comes with the experience of losing 
physical assets and being uprooted against one’s will.8 Furthermore, there are often implicit 
differences in time horizons between refugees and economic immigrants because the former 
                                                 
7 Note that while the location choices of refugees are restricted, potential out-migration effects of natives may 
still be present. 
8 Uprootedness refers to the idea that loss of possessions can have effects on economic behaviour of migrants. 
Brenner and Kiefer (1981) make this point for investment behaviour of forced migrants: “a group which had 
been compelled to emigrate from a country might take the portability of an asset into consideration when 
making an investment in a new country.” 
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sometimes expect not to be able to return home,9 whereas many economic immigrants may 
have explicit plans for return migration. Cortes (2004) documents two primary findings for 
U.S. immigrants. First, refugee migrants on average have lower annual earnings upon arrival; 
however, their annual earnings grow faster over time than those of economic immigrants. 
Second, refugees over time tend to have higher country-specific human capital investment 
than economic immigrants.10 The growing literature on forced migration documents deep and 
long-lasting effects on preferences, behaviour and economic outcomes of forced migrants 
themselves. 
The left-behind 
Migration may also affect those left behind, both in the context of voluntary migration 
and forced migration. A vast literature has explored emigration from developing countries 
and its effects on the sending population (see Docquier and Rapoport, 2012). When it comes 
to forced migration, expulsions target ethnic or religious minorities, partially motivated by 
economic motives. To the extent that many of the situations studied in the literature have 
characterized such minorities as more highly educated, the sending population may incur 
negative consequences in the medium to long run because of the associated loss in human 
capital (e.g. Nobel-prize winning Jewish scientists expelled from Germany under the Nazis).  
New developments in the literature 
In this survey, we will concentrate on research on the consequences of forced migration 
that was published over the last 10 years.11 Two related surveys by Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 
(2013) and Maystadt et al. (2019) are mainly concerned with forced migration in the context 
of developing countries. Given the development angle, they have a stronger focus on civil 
wars. There is also partial overlap with a recent VoxEU book by Fasani (2016) that covers 
                                                 
9 This is more obviously the case when forced migration is the result of redrawn borders, or after natural 
disasters that make the original place of residence uninhabitable. In other cases, refugees may have a justified 
hope to return home once a conflict subsides or once areas affected by a natural disaster become inhabitable 
again. In fact, refugees do return home in many cases, e.g. Burundian and Rwandan refugees in Tanzania (see 
e.g. Kofol and Naghsh Nejad, 2018). 
10 It is not immediately clear whether this pattern translates to Europe. Bell et al. (2013) look at the effect on 
crime of two migration waves to the UK: asylum seekers coming to the UK in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
and economic migrants from Eastern Europe arriving after EU enlargement in 2004. Their finding that the first 
wave led to a modest but significant rise in property crime, while the second wave had a small negative impact, 
is consistent with differences in labour market opportunities, and a lower expected time to remain in the UK for 
asylum seekers: around 70% of asylum seekers had their claim rejected or withdrawn, whereas EU migrants 
have a permanent right to abode by virtue of the EU’s free mobility of labour. 
11Dustmann and Glitz (2011) give a comprehensive overview of research on migration and education. 
However, they “deal mainly with […] movements that are due to individual decisions based on some optimizing 
considerations.” (p. 329), i.e. they do not dwell much on forced migration. The labor market effects of 
(voluntary) immigration are surveyed by Kerr and Kerr (2011), and Dustmann et al. (2016). 
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work on refugees and economic migrants in the EU and U.S., with a particular focus on 
refugee and immigration policies.12 
Our survey goes beyond previous surveys in two ways: first, we extend the time 
coverage to research produced over the past years.13 Second, we extend the scope to cases 
that are historic in nature, as well as to contemporary settings in developed countries. The 
recent literature has seen a burst in work looking at the consequences of forced migration as a 
result of wars, civil conflicts and disasters, often over long time horizons. The latter has been 
facilitated by digitization of historical censuses (see Abramitzky, 2015; Mitchener, 2015), by 
access to novel register data over long time periods, as well as by an increased interest in the 
long shadow of history (see e.g. Nunn, 2009; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013). Another trend 
has been the growing body of research on consequences of natural disasters (e.g. Boustan, 
Kahn, Rhode and Yanguas, 2017). 
Outline and key insights 
We start by surveying the literature on the consequences of forced migration for 
receiving and sending populations.14 After that, we look at the growing literature on the 
consequences of forced migration for the migrants themselves.15 We also deal with the 
decision to migrate under threats, which characterizes situations such as civil wars when 
migration is not universal, leading to selective migration. We close by summarizing key 
insights and by suggesting the most promising areas for future research. 
Our survey brings out important new insights gained from recent research. First, forced 
migration is an experience distinct from voluntary migration. It often comes with the loss of 
possessions, and physical threats at origin or en route to a safer place. It is a life-changing 
experience for many, with the potential to shape economic behaviour of forced migrants and 
their descendants in ways different from merely “changing places”.  
Second, in case of uncertainty over legal status at destination, assimilation can be slower 
                                                 
12 See Hatton (2017) for a detailed discussion of policy options in response to the recent refugee crisis.  
13 For space reasons, we cannot cover the fascinating debate around one of the classical studies of refugee 
flows, the Mariel boatlift originally analysed by Card (1990). See Borjas (2017), Borjas and Monras (2017), 
Clemens and Hunt (2018), and Peri and Yasenov (2018). While the Mariel boatlift brought a mix of political 
refugees (arguably “forced migrants”) and economic migrants, the debate highlights a very important issue: new 
theoretical angles, new data and methodological innovations (e.g. the use of the synthetic control method) can 
shed new light on older findings even after several decades. It is likely that many of the findings we summarize 
will also be re-assessed in the future.  
14 In the context of the literature on voluntary migration, when referring to high-skilled migration, one often 
finds some symmetry in discussion of effects on receiving and sending populations under the heading of brain 
drain, brain gain, and brain exchange. 
15 While our focus is on consequences of forced migration, the causes may well influence the consequences. 
The severity of the experience of forced migration affects the severity of the consequences. 
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than for voluntary migrants. Inversely, forced migrants that expect to never return to their 
place of origin may behave quite differently from economic migrants who often have firm 
plans to return home. Third, many recent studies are concerned with forced mass migrations 
that are not only of interest to economic historians, but also give a unique insight into how 
large exogenous shocks affect various economic outcomes. Such episodes have been used to 
yield insights into areas as broad as labour economics, economic geography, cultural 
economics, health economics and political economy. 
We feel that not all research takes the distinct nature of forced migration seriously 
enough. Researchers often content themselves with either studying an important historic 
episode of forced migration for its own sake – which of course is very valuable –, or by 
exploiting forced migration as a source of exogenous variation. As our survey will show, 
forced migration can lead to lasting behavioural changes because it is often a more life-
changing experience than voluntary migration. We expect additional insights in future work 
that uses insights from other disciplines such as psychology, medicine or sociology to help us 
better understand the link between forced migration and economic behaviour. 
Throughout the paper, we provide tables outlining the studies we discuss in the 
respective sections, that summarize information about many aspects of each of these studies, 
such as their period and unit of observation and the variable(s) of interest.16 
II. Consequences of Forced Migration for Receiving Populations17 
The Employment and Wage Effects of Forced Migration on Locals 
A central topic in the immigration literature is concerned with the impact of immigrants 
on wages and employment of locals.18 Likewise, several papers have considered the effects of 
inflows of forced migrants and refugees on these prominent outcomes. Recent studies find 
mostly positive effects of refugee inflows on host country workers’ wages and employment, 
with few exceptions depending on the context, timeframe, sample composition, and the 
substitutability between locals and displaced workers. 
Maystadt and Verwimp (2014) and Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2015) study the influx of 
refugees fleeing from the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Burundi (1993) and Rwanda (1994) into the 
                                                 
16 Extended versions of these tables are available in the online version: http://doi.org/10.3886/E108422V1. 
We deliberately omit from discussion in the main text most of the papers that were covered in the earlier survey 
on forced migration in a developing country context (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2013), when they fall outside our 
definition of recent work. 
17 Papers in this section are summarized in Table 1. 
18 For instance, see Blau and Kahn (2015) for a review. 
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region of Kagera (north-western Tanzania). Maystadt and Verwimp (2014) show that 
agricultural workers experienced increased competition from refugees, while agricultural 
producers were able to take advantage of the refugee inflow which resulted in lower wages. 
Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2015) demonstrate that larger refugee inflows are associated with a 
higher probability of working for the government or in professional occupations, possibly due 
to the employment opportunities generated by help organizations, or government 
intervention. Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2016) provide further evidence for the reallocation of 
Tanzanians across economic activities. Maystadt and Duranton (2018) confirm that the 
refugee presence has had a persistent and positive impact on the welfare of the local 
population. They attribute this to a decrease in transport costs resulting from investments 
following the refugee inflow. 
Looking at the temporary migration shock resulting the Arab Spring migration through 
Italy in the early 2010’s. Labanca (2016) documents zero overall employment effects on 
natives. However, there are significant and offsetting short-term effects across industries.  
There is evidence of displacement effects in mining, hotels, restaurants and wholesale trade 
but positive effects on employment in construction and educational services. Labanca 
proposes increased demand for goods and services from the latter sectors as one channel why 
employment of natives went up. 
The recent influx of Syrians to Syria’s neighbouring countries and to Europe has created 
ample interest in the resulting employment and wage effects. Tumen (2016) studies the 
inflow of Syrians into the Turkish border regions. Areas with a higher share of Syrian 
refugees experienced a stronger shift from informal to formal employment by locals. Syrians 
were not granted work permits and hence they appear to substitute locals in the informal 
sector. While there was a small increase in the unemployed to population ratio of 0.77 
percentage points, wages were not significantly affected. In the case of Germany, which is 
studied by Gehrsitz and Ungerer (2017), Syrian refugees did not displace local workers but 
faced difficulties in finding gainful employment. Despite the arrival of more than one million 
Syrians in 2015 alone, this result is consistent with the fact that refugees in Germany must 
wait a substantial amount of time before they can enter the labour market (see Marbach et al., 
2018). One difference between the German and Turkish case is the larger size of the Turkish 
informal sector (Tumen, 2016).  
The legal impediments to refugees entering the labour market are usually motivated by 
politicians’ concerns about their local electorate’s response to increased competition in the 
labour market. In a recent paper Clemens et al. (2018) argue that providing refugees with 
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immediate formal labour market access benefits both refugees and hosts, leading to less 
vulnerability and poverty for refugees, and positive effects on fiscal revenue for local 
governments that in turn benefit the host population. 
Sectoral composition is only one dimension that matters. There is also considerable 
heterogeneity in the effects of forced immigration on locals across occupations. The case of 
the Darfur conflict in Sudan from 2003-09 used by Alix-Garcia and Bartlett (2015) is another 
example. They compare long-term urban residents in a treatment and a control city where the 
treated city received an inflow of internally displaced persons. According to their results, 
individuals in the treated city had a higher employment probability and were more likely to 
be employed in the high-skilled sector. While the refugee influx increased the demand for 
goods produced by the local population, it did not offset the negative employment effect from 
increased competition for low-skilled workers. 
Calderón-Mejía and Ibáñez (2016) document negative wage effects from increased 
competition between internally displaced people and host workers in Colombian cities. They 
show that especially the host population of low-skilled workers and those employed in the 
informal sector are affected the worst. However, the impact of refugee inflows on wages not 
only depends on the legal framework and the capacity to which these new workers can be 
accommodated, such as in the comparison between Germany and Turkey, but also on the 
timeframe considered. Morales (2018) also finds negative wage effects coming from inflows 
of internally displaced in the Colombian context. He shows though that this effect dissipates 
over time due to labour reallocation and outmigration. The only group with experienced 
longer lasting wage losses were low-skilled women in this case. 
Negative wage effects arising from increased competition can also be mitigated by 
avoiding competition in the labour market. Tumen (2018) provides evidence that Turkish 
youths in areas with a higher influx of Syrian refugees were more likely to be enrolled in high 
school. Most of the effect is driven by young males with less educated parents. These are the 
new labour market entrants that would have had to compete with the dominantly low-skilled 
Syrian refugees, had they not remained in school for longer. 
There has been a true explosion of papers analysing forced migrations in historic 
contexts.19 From an identification point of view, historic settings oftentimes have the appeal 
of coming with natural experiments that can be exploited to generate exogenous variation in 
the destination location of forced migrants. Braun and Mahmoud (2014) use the case of 
                                                 
19 Most of the studies of historic episodes of forced migration in this section look (mainly) at 
contemporary outcomes. Only few (also) look at long-run outcomes. 
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Germany after World War II as a natural experiment where the resettlement decision was 
highly restricted by authority of the occupation forces. This setting allows to exclude the 
possibility of endogenous location choice of migrants. Using the post-war inflow of 8 million 
Germans from Germany’s former eastern territories to West Germany, they estimate the 
displacement effects on West German workers. Regression results show a substantial 
reduction in the employment of locals. However, they also point out that this is driven by 
strong non-linearities and specific occupations in regions with very high inflow rates. Their 
work thus points to an important econometric challenge: to carefully choose how to split 
samples given the many dimensions along which data can be divided, such as age, gender, 
industry, region, skill, group, among others. Too few splits potentially mask effect 
heterogeneity while too many splits can lead to spurious correlations that arise from multiple 
testing. 
In a later paper, Braun and Dwenger (2017) find that more industrialized counties and 
those with lower refugee inflows were more successful at integration. The size and the 
capacity to accommodate refugees determined the labour market consequences of such 
inflows. Compared to the modern case of Syrian refugees who did not displace German 
workers, not least because of restrictions to their labour market access, the German refugees 
after World War II were more similar with respect to language, culture, and had full voting 
rights. Substitutability of locals and migrants as well as government regulations are key 
drivers of the effect size and direction. 
Testing the mechanisms and channels through which employment and wage effects on 
locals operate is often restricted by data availability. One study that can say more about 
mechanisms is provided by Murard and Sakalli (2018). They exploit the resettlement of 1.2 
million Greeks from Turkey to Greece after the Greco-Turkish War 1919-22. They find 
positive effects of the inflow of forced migrants on long-run economic outcomes. 
Municipalities with a higher refugee inflow in 1923 have higher levels of earnings, household 
wealth, and education in 1991. They also have larger financial and manufacturing sectors. 
According to the authors’ findings, the potential channels behind these positive effects are 
coming from agglomeration economies that led to specialization and knowledge inflows 
which were imported by the refugees. 
Such agglomeration economies are also found by Braun and Kvasnicka (2014) and by 
Peters (2017) in the post-war West-German context. Braun and Kvasnicka (2014) show 
evidence that the influx of expellees from Germany’s former East accelerate the speed of 
transition away from low-productivity agriculture. Peters (2017) finds a positive relation 
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between refugee inflows and per capita incomes, manufacturing employment, and increased 
plant entries from 1933 to 1970. He rationalizes his findings with a general equilibrium trade 
model with local agglomeration that allows for endogenous technological change. 
Another example is the Soviet occupation of South-East Finland during World War II 
which forced a substantial share of the population into other parts of the country. Sarvimäki 
(2011) argues that this population inflow generated significant agglomeration economies in 
receiving areas. These host municipalities experienced subsequently higher population 
growth and developed faster in terms of wages and industrial development. This paper shows 
that agglomeration economies matter even when the initial stock of population is relatively 
low before the inflow of new workers. 
Prices, Consumption, and Production 
The influx of forced migrants not only means an addition of workers but also of 
consumers. The reaction of goods prices depends on the degree to which refugees can 
contribute to their production. In Turkey, Syrian refugees mainly found employment in the 
informal sector which reduced the prices of goods produced by this part of the economy 
(Tumen, 2016; Balkan and Tumen, 2016). Alix-Garcia et al. (2018) study the case of Kenya, 
where refugees were not allowed to work.  Instead, refugees generated increased demand for 
agricultural and livestock products that the hosts produced. This in turn relates to higher 
economic activity (proxied by nightlight intensity) and consumption in host communities.  
In the Sudanese context considered by Alix-Garcia and Bartlett (2015), displaced 
individuals raised prices for goods due to higher demand. Competition for consumption is 
also likely to be fiercer in markets that are slow to adjust supply such as housing and farm 
land. Alix-Garcia et al. (2011) study the price behaviour of food and housing in Sudan after 
the Darfur conflict. While food prices were unaffected, mainly due to foreign aid, house 
prices increased.20 Also Depetris-Chauvin and Santos (2018) find substantial price increases 
in Colombian cities that received more internally displaced persons. The price increase is not 
uniform. Excess demand for low-income accommodation raised prices for this type of 
housing while at the same time the house prices for high-income accommodations fell. They 
argue that the latter effect is due to excess supply and an increase in homicide rates. 
Balkan et al. (2018) find the opposite case for the influx of Syrian refugees into Turkey. 
They show that Turks, trying to avoid living with refugees, increasingly sought higher quality 
                                                 
20 Note that also the type of aid made available can affect such developments. Taylor et al. (2017) provide a 
simulation exercise to quantify the impact of cash aid to refugees using Congolese refugee camps in Rwanda. 
They argue that such aid can create positive spill-over effects for host households and businesses in the locality 
where refugees are hosted. 
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housing which therefore increased prices for this type of accommodation. At the same time, 
the price for lower quality housing remained unchanged as the Turks who moved away were 
replaced by refugees. Mobility of locals and attitudes towards incoming refugees can 
therefore generate a complex pattern with respect to the resulting price effects. 
Such price developments are worrisome as they potentially affect the social peace by 
increasing inequality. With low-income accommodation typically being rented, this leads to a 
higher income share that is transferred from renters to owners of property. The distributional 
consequences of refugee inflows for wealth or income inequality among locals have received 
comparatively less attention. 
Another potential source of societal problems arises when the inflow of labour and 
productivity does not offset the increased demand, prices for food items rise which can have 
strong negative impacts on the local population as shown by Kofol and Naghsh Nejad (2018). 
They study the case of Tanzania and how the inflow of Burundian and Rwandan refugees in 
1993-94 affected child labour. While they find a decline in child labour in the immediate 
post-inflow years, the picture reverses 10 years later. As agricultural productivity could not 
match the increased demand, household welfare fell, and more children were drawn into farm 
work and food production. 
The opposite scenario also exists in which refugees have a positive net effect on 
productivity which can potentially decrease prices. Such productivity shocks have been 
shown to have long-lasting effects on host economies.  
One such case is the expulsion of ca. 43,000 Huguenots from France in 1685, of whom 
almost half settled in Brandenburg-Prussia. and who raised the productivity of textile 
manufactories, as shown by Hornung (2014). These skilled workers not only brought 
knowledge or technology with them. They partially offset the population lost due to war, 
plague, and famine during the Thirty Years’ War. The positive productivity effects can be 
found more than hundred years after the expulsion of the Huguenots which Hornung (2014) 
estimates by using Prussian firm-level data from 1802.  
From a modern perspective, this is a special case wherein the population of forced 
migrants was more skilled than the local population. Another case is that of expelled Jewish 
scientists from Nazi Germany who advanced innovation and patenting in the U.S. (Moser et 
al., 2014). They show that the expulsion and persecution of scientists in Nazi-Germany led to 
emigration of these high-skilled workers to the U.S. Using inventor-level data, the authors 
 13 
show that these forced migrants spurred inventions and patents in chemistry. They did so by 
attracting scientists to their field rather than increasing productivity of incumbent inventors.21  
Mirza (2018) looks at the population exchange between India and Pakistan after the 
partition. This exchange implied a movement of 17 million people across the two countries 
within less than four years. Using district-level data in Pakistan, he finds that areas where the 
population exchange was more intense have experienced faster growth in urbanization and 
have seen greater improvements in literacy in the long-run. This result is explained by the 
fact that the refugees who moved to Pakistan were better educated than the native population 
and tended to concentrate more in non-agricultural occupations. 
While all these studies are historic, similar effects can be found for the modern case. The 
inflow of Syrian refugees to Turkey from 2012 onward benefitted firms as refugee labour 
acted as a complement to formal labour (similar to Tumen, 2016). This increased entry by 
foreign firms in high-inflow areas and raised profits and sales, according to Akgündüz et al. 
(2018). However, the authors are cautious about pre-existing trends in their profits and sales 
measures across different regions. Nevertheless, their findings on firm entries can explain the 
limited employment effects found for locals. While refugees increase competition among the 
low-skilled, this is offset by new firms entering into the market. A similar conclusion is 
reached by Altındağ et al. (2018). They show that firms in receiving areas increased 
production at the intensive and extensive margin, especially if they drew labour from the 
informal sector, such as construction or hospitality businesses. 
Political and Other Outcomes 
During the influx of Syrians to Europe, some countries welcomed refugees while others 
did not (see Bordignon and Moriconi, 2017). Attitudes towards refugees and other forced 
migrants can be volatile depending on public opinion. A factor that influences the latter is 
how well refugees fit into their host society on multiple dimensions. Even for more 
homogeneous migrant-host relations, such as the case of Germans from the eastern territories 
after World War II, differences in religion reduced intermarriage and increased local support 
for anti-expellee parties (Braun and Dwenger, 2017). 
For the case of Syrians in Germany after 2015, Gehrsitz and Ungerer (2017) do not find 
a relationship between higher refugee inflows and anti-refugee party vote shares at the county 
level. This is despite a small but significant increase of criminal offenses in these areas. They 
                                                 
21 A related study, but for voluntary migration of Soviet mathematicians to the U.S. after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union is Borjas and Doran (2012). 
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show that drug and fare-dodging offenses rose slightly, a fact that the authors partially 
attribute to the high hurdles for refugees to enter the German labour market. 
Results on this topic are, however, mixed. Dinas et al. (2018) find that Greek islands 
which experienced larger inflows and pass-through migration of Syrian and other refugees in 
2015 increased their support for the extreme right party. They estimate an average increase in 
vote shares for the Golden Dawn party of 2 percentage points. While this sounds modest, it is 
a 44% increase when compared to the average vote share that this party typically receives. 
Dustmann et al. (2018) find a similar result for Denmark. They show that refugee allocation 
influences voter turnout and that larger shares of allocated refugees leads to a right-shift in 
voting behaviour. This benefits the extreme right and to a lesser extent the centre-right 
parties. Interestingly, they find this for all but the largest municipalities. In the most urban 
municipalities, the effect is the opposite. 
In closely related work, Hangartner et al. (2018) conduct a (natural) survey experiment 
in Greek islands and check natives’ attitudes and political activism against refugees. Not only 
do they find strong anti-refugee and anti-immigrant attitudes and activism but also moderate 
spill-over effects to other outgroups that persist in time.  
Another less explored area is how refugees themselves affect political outcomes which, 
in turn, impact the host population. Chevalier et al. (2018) examine the West-German setting 
after World War II to show that the refugee inflow from the former eastern territories 
significantly altered taxation and spending patterns of local governments. While areas with 
higher refugee inflows increased taxation for businesses and farms, they reduced spending on 
infrastructure and housing, and instead raised welfare expenditures. The authors show that 
these changes in spending patterns are persistent. They attribute this in part to the political 
influence of refugees who, as de facto Germans, had full voting rights in West Germany.22 
Refugees sometimes actively affect the societal and political landscape in their host 
countries. One such case is the failed 1848 democratic revolution in the German states. The 
political leaders of the revolution, the so-called Forty-Eighters, ultimately had to flee and 
most of them ended up in the United States. Dippel and Heblich (2018) show that towns that 
received a Forty-Eighter had up to 80% higher enlistment rates on the side of the Union 
Army during the U.S. Civil War (1861-65). Due to their libertarian ideals, the revolutionary 
                                                 
22 Tabellini (2018a,b) has similar work for two voluntary migration waves in the U.S., namely the mass 
immigration of Europeans in the early 20th century and the Great Migration of blacks into northern U.S. cities 
in the mid 20th century. He shows that both inflows led to lower public spending, and in the case of the 
European immigration, to lower local taxes. Mayda et al. (2016) note that naturalization of immigrants has a 
crucial influence on election results, as immigrants are less likely to vote Republican. 
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leaders were strongly opposed to slavery. If a Forty-Eighter led a regiment, then those had 
markedly lower desertion rates. The effect is particularly pronounced for German-born 
soldiers. The study shows how these forced migrants carried their political ideals into the 
New World, and how they inspired others to fight for them. 
Schumann (2014) takes an economic geography perspective on expellee inflows into 
West Germany after WWII. His work starts from the observation that expellees were 
resettled only into the British and American occupation zones, but not in the French-occupied 
zone. Using a spatial regression discontinuity framework, he estimates the persistence of the 
population shock over a 20-year-period. The difference in population levels originating from 
differential location patterns is highly persistent, suggesting that population patterns in the 
post-WWII decades in West Germany were not determined by locational fundamentals. 
When forced migrants differ from the receiving population in their social norms, this can 
lead to diffusion of norms between the two groups. Blum et al. (2018) study Stalin’s ethnic 
deportations during World War II. Their emphasis is on the comparison of areas that received 
mostly Protestant Volga Germans and areas that received Muslims from the North Caucasus. 
Both groups were deported from their original homelands within the Soviet Union to reduce 
the risk that these groups of non-Russians would undermine Soviet war efforts. Both groups 
were only allowed to return to their homelands after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
key finding is that in areas with more Protestant deportees, more gender-equal norms (which 
happened to coincide with Soviet ideology) diffused among the native Russian population,23 
whereas more gender-unequal norms of Muslim deportees did not spread. 
III. Consequences of Forced Migration for Sending Populations24 
Events such as wars or natural disasters affect the entirety of a local population but not 
necessarily everyone flees from such events. Whether stayers are positively or negatively 
selected depends on the conditions of the event. Stayers may be the wealthiest who have the 
means to cope with the adverse conditions, or the poorest who could not afford to relocate out 
of harm’s way. In the case of civil wars, those who stay could be the least risk-averse or the 
most loyal to the current regime. In this sense, there are as many potential reasons for staying 
as for migrating. 
                                                 
23 Becker and Woessmann (2008) show evidence of more gender equality in education in Protestant versus 
Catholic counties in Prussia, potentially a consequence of Luther’s urge that every town should have a girls’ 
school. 
24 Papers in this section are summarized in Table 2. 
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Estimating how forced migration affects the stayer population is difficult when the cause 
for migration affects outcomes directly. The main challenge is to disentangle the direct effect 
of the natural catastrophe or war from the effects generated by the outmigration of select 
groups of individuals. Such issues are also faced by the related literature that studies the 
brain-drain generated by the departure of skilled and talented migrants for economic 
reasons.25 
The effects of forced migration from the viewpoint of the stayer population are more 
easily studied when they are politically motivated. State-mandated expulsions, which are 
targeted against a specific group, are normally near-universal. Examples of this are the 
expulsions of Greeks and Armenians from the Ottoman Empire during and after World War 
I, the persecution and mass murder of Jews in Nazi Germany, or the removal of Poles from 
the Polish Eastern Borderlands (Kresy) after World War II by the Soviets. By definition, in 
the case of universal expulsion of certain groups, the effects of forced migration on stayers 
can only be analysed for individuals who do not belong to the affected migrant group.26 The 
consensus in the literature is that expulsions tend to generate negative outcomes for stayers 
both at the individual but also the aggregate level in the sending economies. 
Aggregate Effects on Economies at Origin 
Mass scale expulsions have the potential to affect long-run economic outcomes by 
permanently altering an economy’s social structure. Nunn (2008) and Nunn and Wantchékon 
(2011) look at the long-run effect of Africa’s slave trade in the period 1400 to 1900 on 
modern-day outcomes in Africa. Even though the term slave “trade” describes an economic 
interaction (e.g. manufactured goods against humans), it arguably constitutes a massive 
episode of forced migration – certainly against the will of the slaves – to various destinations 
outside Africa. Nunn (2008) shows robust negative relationship between the number of slaves 
exported from a country and current economic performance. Nunn and Wantchékon (2011) 
show that current differences in trust levels within Africa can be traced back to the 
transatlantic and Indian Ocean slave trades. 
Acemoglu et al. (2011) study the effect of the Holocaust on economic growth outcomes 
in Soviet cities and administrative areas (oblasts). They compare cities and oblasts with and 
without Nazi occupation during World War II. The authors provide evidence that increased 
                                                 
25 For a review see Docquier and Rapoport (2012). 
26 Even though state mandated expulsions seek to remove an entire sub-population, usually some individuals 
of the affected group remain. This is because they are in hiding, disguise, or could take advantage of rare 
exceptions, such as Germans who married a Czech which opened the opportunity to re-apply for Czech 
citizenship and avoid expulsion from the Czech borderlands after World War II (see Testa, 2018). 
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intensity in the persecution and mass murder of Jews by the Nazis reduced cities’ population 
size and increased vote shares for Communist political candidates in the post-war period. 
They find significantly lower wages and per capita incomes in affected oblasts today. The 
main channel which is proposed for this finding is the reduction in the size of the middle 
class. As in the German case, Jews in the Soviet Union were overrepresented in white collar 
middle-class employment. The shock to this social structure is supposedly what is driving the 
persistence of the effects. 
Grosfeld et al. (2013) exploit a spatial discontinuity created by the “Pale of Settlement” 
where Jews had permission to reside in the Russian Empire. With the Nazi invasion during 
World War II, the Pale of Settlement saw the expulsion of Jews and therefore became more 
similar to municipalities across this informal border in terms of culture, ethnicity, and 
religion. The cohabitation of Jews and non-Jews on the Pale side of the border created strong 
within-group loyalty due to ethnic animosity. Despite the murder and deportation of Jews by 
the Nazis, the authors show that these entrenched cultural attitudes did not die out. Instead, 
they are still visible in a significant anti-market culture, lower entrepreneurialism, and higher 
levels of trust among nowadays residents on the side of the Pale.  
While cohabitation of groups can generate long lasting negative outcomes that persist 
even after the expulsion of a given group, the opposite is also possible. Arbatli and Gokmen 
(2018) show that Turkish districts that used to have an Armenian or Greek community until 
their expulsion in 1915-17 and 1919-23, respectively, have higher population density, 
urbanization rates, and night time luminosity today. They argue that the long-run persistence 
of these positive effects is driven by the minority communities’ effect on local human capital 
accumulation.   
Not only the social but also the economic structure and local institutions can be severely 
affected. Pascali (2016) provides evidence that Italian municipalities that expelled their 
Jewish population in the 15th and 16th century have a less developed banking system and 
lower incomes today. A recent paper by Testa (2018) uses the expulsion of 3 million 
Germans from the Czechoslovak borderlands after World War II as a natural experiment. In 
this case, Czechs and Germans were quite homogeneous in terms of their economic and 
cultural characteristics. For identification, he uses a spatial regression discontinuity design 
that exploits the border of the former Sudetenland to Nazi Germany which was formed after 
annexation of the Western part of Czechoslovakia in 1938 after the Munich agreement. 
Czech municipalities across this border, where Germans were driven away after the war, 
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were found to have a lower population density, higher rates of unemployment, less skill-
intensive industries, and lower levels of education in 2011.  
One mechanism behind these persistent effects identified by Testa (2018) is the lack of 
agglomeration economies.27 While 3 million Germans had been expelled, only 1.2 million 
Czechs replaced them in the two years following the war. Another channel is the erosion of 
property rights. Settlers competed for abandoned German houses and productive assets while 
local authorities abused their power for personal gain. The lack of agglomeration economies, 
the negative selection of settlers, and the low protection of property rights generated the 
dynamics for the negative persistence of the expulsion in the long-run. 
Forced Migration and the Human Capital of Stayers 
The negative aggregate effects tend to be rooted in the adverse results generated by 
forced migration on stayers at the individual level for key factors of growth such as human 
capital accumulation. A prominent setting for the study of forced migration and the 
educational outcomes of the staying population is the case of Jews in Nazi Germany. As a 
highly educated group themselves, Jews were disproportionally often employed as teachers in 
schools or universities. Their expulsion from civil service between 1933-38 had significant 
negative educational effects for the non-Jewish population in Germany at all levels of 
instruction. 
Using individual level data from the German Socioeconomic Panel, Akbulut-Yuksel and 
Yuksel (2015) show that adults, who were of school age during the years of persecution, had 
fewer years of education, and a lower probability to have completed school or to go to 
university. They use cohort and regional variation in the percentage of Jewish population as a 
natural experiment. The deficit in human capital accumulation is particularly strong for girls, 
for boys who lived in areas with particularly high shares of Jewish population, and for those 
whose parents had lower levels of education. Given that their effects can be found for adults 
fifty years after the Holocaust, an open question is how their children were affected or 
whether there are intergenerational effects of the expulsions. 
Bharadwaj et al. (2015) find similar educational effects from the population exchange 
between India and Pakistan after the partition using district level data. While they work with 
aggregate data that cannot directly show the impact on educational attainment on the stayer 
population in India, they provide evidence for strong compositional changes. A 10% increase 
                                                 
27 Interestingly, this is the mirror image of Sarvimäki’s (2011) case of Finland, where the inflow of refugees 
from South-East Finland to the rest of the country generated agglomeration economies and positive economic 
developments as a consequence. 
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in outflows is associated with literacy rates that are about 1.2 percentage points lower. 
However, given the exchange character of this migration event, the same increase in inflows 
raised literacy by 3 percentage points. This is due to the higher educational attainment among 
migrants. Whether the stayer population gains or not depends on whether inflows offset 
outflows, and on the size of spillover effects that arise from having a more literate 
community in affected districts. 
In the context of tertiary education, Waldinger (2010) documents significant drops in 
faculty quality among universities’ mathematics departments where more Jewish scientists 
were removed from service by the Nazis. Using a novel data set on mathematics PhD 
students between 1923 to 1938, he shows the long-run effects of the faculty quality drop on 
these new scholars. Affected PhD students at the time were less likely to publish their 
dissertation, to be promoted to full professor, and had lower lifetime citations. These effects 
were concentrated among younger scholars and did not affect those with an already 
established career, as Waldinger (2012) finds no effects of changes in peer quality on the 
scholarly outcomes of professors in mathematics, physics, and chemistry departments. 
Effects on Firm-Level Outcomes in Sending Economies 
Expulsion of high-skilled can be detrimental also to firm-level outcomes. An example 
for this is provided by Huber et al. (2018). They consider large firms in Nazi Germany after 
the removal of Jewish managers. The population share of Jews in Germany in the early 1930s 
was less than one percent, yet the share of senior managers with a Jewish background was 
close to 16 percent. The dismissal of these leaders was associated with a reduction in the 
observable characteristics of firms’ senior management with respect to experience, university 
degrees, and connections to other firms. The authors show a significant drop in firm value on 
the stock markets which lasts until the end of the sample period in 1943. Dividend payments 
and the return to assets were reduced as a result. 
Even though the evidence so far is mainly focused on historic contexts that provide 
natural experiments for internally valid identification of effects, the overall indication is that 
forced migration of certain subpopulations via expulsion is detrimental to locals of the 
sending economy. This is true both at the individual and the aggregate level. The caveat is 
again that Jews were an above-average skilled group. Yet, the case of the Czech borderlands 
also shows that expulsion of a group (Germans) that is quite similar to locals (Czechs) can 
have lasting negative consequences for the expelling economy. 
Another focal point of the previous literature has been human capital. What has received 
comparatively less attention is that forcing out substantial parts of the population can have 
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additional negative consequences. This may be due to the destruction of physical capital in 
the case of war, formal and informal networks, or agglomeration economies. For instance, the 
lack of sufficiently densely populated areas can harm the expelling economy in the long-run 
(see Testa, 2018). 
Returning Refugees 
Bahar et al. (2018) take a fascinating look at the effect of repatriation of Yugoslavian 
refugees from Germany, which was triggered by end of the war and the special “protected” 
status of refugees in Germany. They provide causal evidence on the role that migrants play in 
explaining productivity shifts (as measured by export performance) in their home countries 
after their return. In fact, return migrants provide for export links, i.e. industries benefit from 
the experience refugees gained while away in Germany. 
IV. Consequences of Forced Migration for Migrants Themselves28 
Forced migration not only affects receiving and sending populations, but also migrants 
themselves. The literature on voluntary migration has a long tradition of studying 
assimilation of migrants, in both the first and subsequent generations (e.g. Algan et al. 2010; 
Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). International migrants may need to invest in language skills 
and other country-specific human capital. Institutional differences in childcare may affect 
fertility choices. Assimilation can be multi-dimensional, in terms of socio-economic and 
political outcomes, but migration may also affect cultural choices such as name choice and 
acquired tastes (see e.g. Bisin and Verdier, 2000; Abramitzky et al., 2018). Many of these 
dimensions are shared between voluntary and forced migrants.  
What sets forced migration apart is its involuntary nature. This comes with at least four 
distinguishing features that may affect the consequences of forced migration for migrants 
themselves. First, forced migrants experiencing civil wars, expulsions, or natural disasters 
may bear lasting effects due to the physical or psychological trauma not experienced by 
voluntary migrants. Second, forced migrants may lose assets as a result of destruction, 
expropriation, or because of a hasty departure. Third, they may end up in a suboptimal 
location as they did not choose to migrate in the first place, and as a result may have limited 
control over where they go.29 Fourth, their political and economic status at destination may 
                                                 
28 Papers in this section are summarized in Table 3. 
29 There is also the opposite possibility: in “normal times” (i.e. when there is no humanitarian case), some 
countries may not admit economic migrants from certain countries of origin but may well admit refugees from 
those same countries when they come as refugees. 
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be uncertain and their expected time of abode may differ from that of voluntary migrants.30 In 
some circumstances, forced migrants may expect that there is a low probability of return to 
their home regions (e.g. expulsions after WWII), in others there might be a realistic 
expectation to return home (e.g. after floods). In both cases, the uncertainty surrounding the 
time of abode is probably larger than for voluntary migrants. 
Recent research has looked at a large number of different outcomes for forced migrants 
themselves, ranging from labour market outcomes, education and wealth, to health and 
political outcomes. 
A major part of this recent research on forced migrants has exploited historic episodes of 
forced expulsions and population exchanges following major wars. This is partially explained 
by what Mitchener (2015) called “The 4D Future of Economic History: Digitally-Driven 
Data Design.” Digitization of more and more historical censuses has permitted researchers to 
analyse the consequences of forced migration on outcomes of forced migrants and their 
descendants, often over several generations. But some researchers have also generated new 
survey evidence on ancestry which allows us to trace outcomes over longer horizons. This 
recent research thus permits us to learn not only of the short-term challenges faced by forced 
migrants, but also how their children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren have fared. 
Labour market outcomes 
The literature on voluntary migration has a longstanding tradition of looking at the 
assimilation of migrants in their destination country. In the context of labour market 
outcomes, this literature documents how education, occupations and earnings of first- and 
second-generation migrants converge (or not) with those of locals.  
Dustmann et al. (2017) give a comprehensive overview of refugee flows into the EU in 
the last decades and the related literature.31 To assess how well past refugees to EU countries 
have integrated into the labour market compared to economic immigrants from the same area 
of origin, they draw on the 2008 wave of the European Labour Force Survey (EULFS) that 
allows them to differentiate between economic and refugee migrants. They look at 
unconditional and conditional (on age, gender and educational attainment) employment rate 
differentials between locals and, respectively, EU15 economic immigrants, non-EU15 
economic immigrants and refugees overall. Although all immigrant types have lower 
employment probabilities than locals, both conditionally and unconditionally, the 
                                                 
30 One group of voluntary migrants that also might perceive uncertainty are illegal immigrants. 
31 De la Rica et al. (2015) give an extensive overview of immigration in Europe, including migration policies. 
They cover both voluntary migrants and refugees. 
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employment gaps are larger for non-EU15 immigrants than for EU15 immigrants (3.2 versus 
7.2 percentage points unconditional on socio-economic characteristics) and increase to 16.1 
percentage points for refugees. Over time, however, refugees catch up in terms of 
employment. This contrasts with Bratsberg et al. (2014, 2017) who, for Norway, highlight 
that refugees become increasingly dependent on social insurance transfers. 
A growing number of papers over the last decade have looked at the economic 
integration of forced migrants. Many papers study expulsions in the wake of WWII, when 
European borders were redrawn. More than 8 million ethnic Germans were expelled from 
Eastern Europe,32 from territories of the German Empire, and neighbouring countries where 
Germans had often resided for centuries. Since most of them were expelled from Germany’s 
former Eastern territories, they moved from one part of (former) Germany to another part of 
Germany. 
Falck et al. (2012) analyse the success of the ‘Federal Expellee Law’ 
(Bundesvertriebenengesetz), in restoring the pre-war occupational status of forced migrants. 
They find no evidence for a positive effect of the policy on the labour market integration of 
migrants. They explain these findings by the general economic boom in West Germany after 
WWII, which improved economic conditions for locals and expellees alike. Bauer et al. 
(2013) go beyond this work and analyse the economic integration of first-generation migrants 
and their offspring more broadly, looking at a larger set of outcomes. After 25 years, first 
generation migrants still tend to fare worse economically, except for displaced agricultural 
workers. The latter exhibit higher incomes than comparable locals, as displacement caused 
large-scale transitions out of low-paid agriculture. Differences in economic outcomes of 
second generation migrants resemble those of the first generation, attesting to a lack of 
convergence even after several decades. The authors interpret this as evidence that the 
economic consequences of displacement and the ensuing adjustment processes are long 
lasting despite the absence of language differences which typically affects (international) 
migrants. 
Forced migration in the wake of WWII also affected other countries. Sarvimäki et al. 
(2018) study the forced migration of 11% of the Finnish population after the Soviet invasion 
in 1939. Farmers were resettled to areas resembling the origin regions and given land and 
assistance to continue farming. Nevertheless, many left agriculture and, on average, displaced 
farmers ended up earning 11-28% more than comparable non-displaced farmers, suggesting 
                                                 
32 Some studies report 12 million expelled Germans, which includes the 4.1 million refugees who settled in 
the eastern part of post-WWII Germany, i.e. the later GDR. 
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substantial returns to leaving farming. However, almost three quarters of the non-displaced 
farmers chose to remain in agriculture. The fact that so many stayed in agriculture at their 
location of origin, despite higher income outside agriculture, can be rationalized with a 
simple habit formation model (or rational addiction model a la Becker and Murphy, 1988), 
where people are willing to forgo income in order to stay in the location they call home. On 
the other hand, the fact that more than half of the displaced farmers decided to stay in 
agriculture suggests that a substantial fraction of farmers either had comparative advantage in 
agriculture or strong preferences for working in agriculture regardless of the location where 
their farms were located. 
Expulsion also affected Poles living in the Eastern territories of Poland that were taken 
over by the Soviet Union. These Poles were resettled to Central Poland as well as to the 
newly acquired Western Territories, the formerly German areas. What is different in the 
Polish context is that the Western Territories of post-WWII Poland were less congested, with 
ca. 8 million Germans leaving, and substantially fewer migrating Poles replacing them. So, 
while German expellees in Western Germany faced a degree of congestion, in Poland’s 
Western Territories, land and other assets were abundant. While Becker et al. (2018) focus on 
educational outcomes (to be discussed later), they also show that – as a result of an increase 
in educational attainment of Polish expellees – they have higher earnings than their Polish 
compatriots, who are either stayers or voluntary movers from parts of Poland that were not 
subject to expulsions. The earnings results draw on data of second- and third generation 
migrants measured in 2015, i.e. they capture very long-run outcomes.  
Together, these recent results on forced migration in the context of WWII suggest that 
there is no uniform cost or benefit of expulsion across countries, but that medium- to long-
run effects depend on the country-specific context. While West Germany, with its high 
population density, was quite congested, making it harder for expellees to compete with 
locals, in the Finnish and Polish context, (many) expellees did well compared to their 
compatriots. 
Natural disasters are another group of events that have received a lot of attention over 
the last years. Here, displacement is generally within the same country and is often 
temporary, i.e. in this literature return migration is one outcome of interest. Among the events 
recently studied are hurricanes in the U.S., and volcano eruptions in Iceland. Deryugina et al. 
(2018) show that hurricane Katrina in 2005 had large and persistent effects on location choice 
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of individuals, and only small and transitory negative effects on income and employment. 
They document these results using detailed Federal tax returns over the period 1999-2013.33 
Nakamura et al. (2018) exploit the outbreak of a volcano on the Westman Islands in 
Iceland in 1973. They show that individuals whose houses were destroyed moved away 
permanently. Those aged 25 and older (“parents”) lost out slightly in terms of lifetime 
earnings. But those younger than 25 years of age at the time of the volcano eruption 
experienced marked gains in lifetime earnings and education despite the relative economic 
wealth of their origin location. The authors call this “the gift of moving” and interpret their 
findings in a way that is related to Sarvimäki et al. (2018): some people are “stuck” in 
locations that do not fully exploit their economic potential. Young people have a sufficiently 
long time horizon to be able to benefit from the opportunities available away from a 
suboptimal location of origin. 
Similarities with large waves of voluntary migration 
The digital revolution has not only helped new research on forced migration, but also on 
voluntary migration. Since our focus here is on forced migration, we only selectively mention 
research on voluntary migration that is arguably most closely related. Forced migration is 
often characterized by its massive scale, so the closest equivalent in terms of voluntary 
migration is the U.S. Age of Mass Migration, from 1850 to 1913, when ca. 30 million 
migrants, mostly from Europe, moved to the U.S. Important recent contributions have 
documented several important findings: Abramitzky et al. (2014), using U.S. Census Data 
from 1920 and 1950, look at occupation-based earnings of 1st and 2nd generation immigrants 
that entered the U.S. during the Age of Mass Migration and show that migrants assimilated 
well. Alexander and Ward (2018), looking at the same period, show that longer home-
country exposure has negative effects on children’s later-life outcomes, i.e. results were 
better for children entering the U.S. at a very young age. This finding along the age profile 
relates to findings in the forced migration literature in that those moving at young age do 
better economically than those moving at a later age.34 Becker and Fetzer (2018) study the 
                                                 
33 These results go beyond the early findings of Groen and Polivka (2008) who found that, compared to 
workers in unaffected areas, the unemployment rate of evacuees was 7.4 pp higher (30.6 pp for non-returnees, 6 
pp for returnees) initially. With approximately 60 percent of evacuees from Louisiana returning to their pre-
hurricane addresses within 14 months, their initial employment gap dissipated quickly and substantially over 
time. 
34 A benefit of moving at young age is also found in the related context of mobility to better neighbourhoods 
in the U.S. in the context of the “Moving to Opportunity” (MTO) experiment which randomly allocated housing 
vouchers to a sample of families living in low-income public housing (Chetty et al., 2016) or as a result of 
public housing demolitions (Chyn, 2018). Since these papers are considered with local mobility and not with 
migration, we do not discuss them in further detail. 
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effect of immigration from Eastern Europe to the UK following EU enlargement in 2004. 
They show that Eastern Europeans mostly settled in places that had limited prior exposure to 
immigration. These areas subsequently saw smaller wage growth at the lower end of the 
wage distribution and increased pressure on the welfare state, housing and public services.  
Education 
Education is the focus of a recent paper by Becker et al. (2018). After World War II, the 
Polish borders were redrawn, resulting in large-scale migration. Poles were forced to move 
from the Kresy territories in the East (taken over by the USSR) and were resettled mostly to 
the newly acquired Western Territories, from which Germans were expelled. While there 
were no pre-WWII differences in education, Poles with a family history of forced migration 
are significantly more educated today. Descendants of forced migrants have on average one 
extra year of schooling, driven by a higher propensity to finish secondary or higher 
education. This result holds when restricting ancestral locations to a subsample around the 
former Kresy border and include fixed effects for the destination of migrants. As Kresy 
migrants were of the same ethnicity and religion as other Poles, confounding factors of other 
cases of forced migration can be bypassed. Labour market competition with locals and 
selection of migrants are also unlikely to drive their results. Survey evidence suggests that 
forced migration led to a shift in preferences, away from material possessions and towards 
investment in a mobile asset – human capital. The effects persist over three generations. 
Several of the papers mentioned already show results for education as one of several 
outcomes. For instance, Nakamura et al. (2018) showed that young people leaving the 
Westman Islands as a result of the volcano eruption have 3.5 years higher educational 
attainment than young people whose houses were unaffected by the volcano eruption. The 
explanation for this result is that most young people on the Westman Islands work in the 
fishing and fish processing industries that alone account for roughly 70% of income in the 
Westman Islands (compared to 15% in the rest of Iceland). Children with comparative skill 
advantages in jobs requiring a large amount of education such as law, computer science, 
engineering, or medicine, benefit from the forced move to mainland Iceland. As mentioned 
earlier, Bauer et al. (2013) show that 1st and 2nd generation German refugees expelled from 
Eastern Europe and re-settled in Western Germany fare worse across a variety of economic 
outcomes, except those displaced from agriculture who move into new sectors that require 
them to acquire the associated educational degrees. 
Looking at the effects of Hurricane Katrina on student test scores, Sacerdote (2012) 
highlights that students forced to switch schools experience sharp declines in test scores in 
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the first year following the hurricanes. However, by the third and fourth years after the 
disaster, there is a marked improvement in scores that is mostly driven by the lowest 
quintile.35 Different from the papers discussed above, this paper looks at test scores instead of 
years of schooling or educational degrees, and at relatively short-term outcomes, which is 
natural given the outcome of interest. 
Health and well-being 
Several fascinating recent studies have highlighted the long-run health effects of forced 
migration. Bauer et al. (2017) show that post-WWII German expellees have a 12-21% (men) 
and 3-9% (women) higher mortality risk after the age of 68. Only individuals with 
significantly higher lifetime earnings (top quintile of the lifetime earnings distribution) 
overcome this effect. 
Haukka et al. (2017), looking at the case of expulsion of Finns by the Soviets in 1940, 
find that forced migration was associated with increased risk of death due to (ischemic) heart 
diseases. In contrast, they observe lower suicide mortality among forced migrants 25 or more 
years after expulsion. In earlier, related work, Saarela and Finnas (2009) detected increased 
mortality risk of displaced Finns during the late 1980s, during Gorbachev’s Perestroika 
period, that resulted in an intense debate in civil society about restitution of the ceded areas. 
They explain those results with psychosocial stress arising from renewed hope of returning 
home several decades after the expulsion. 
The work by Lavy et al. (2016) the important role of better health care in utero for 
education outcomes of refugee children. On May 24, 1991, over 14,000 Ethiopian Jews (all 
the Jewish population who lived in Addis Ababa and almost the entire Jewish population 
remaining in Ethiopia) were airlifted to Israel within 36 hours in an operation named 
“Operation Solomon”. Ethiopian children born in Israel between May 27, 1991 and February 
15, 1992, had access to better in-utero healthcare in Israel for different durations. They find 
that children exposed in an earlier stage of the pregnancy to better environmental conditions 
in utero have two decades later higher educational attainment and higher education quality 
(better high school results). 
Assignment of Refugees 
Unlike voluntary migrants, who are generally free to choose their location of residence, 
conditional on obtaining the right to enter a country (e.g. work visa, or EU free mobility of 
labour), refugees are often constrained in their location choice in the host country. A lot of 
                                                 
35 Sacerdote quotes Arne Duncan, U.S. Secretary of Education, stating in January 2010: “I think the best thing 
that happened to the education system in New Orleans was Hurricane Katrina.” 
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research has considered the effect of random assignment of refugees on the host population, 
as this exogenous variation in exposure of the host population to refugees convincingly 
identifies causal effects. 
An area that has received increasing attention over the last years is how random 
assignment of refugees to specific locations affects their chances to succeed.36 Beaman 
(2012) studies the role of social networks on the dynamics of labour market outcomes, using 
evidence from refugees resettled in the U.S. The key finding is that an increase in the number 
of social network members resettled in the same year or one year prior to a new arrival leads 
to a deterioration of outcomes, while a greater number of tenured network members improves 
the probability of employment and raises the hourly wage. 
In closely related work using the same U.S. refugee resettlement program, Dagnelie et 
al. (2018) show that entrepreneurs in the refugee network help refugees from the same home 
country to find jobs in the U.S. upon arrival. A refugee’s employment probability is 
positively related to the number of business owners in their network (and who can employ 
them) and negatively related to the number of employees in their network (who they would 
compete with for jobs). 
In Switzerland, Bansak et al. (2018) find that the ability to speak French (i.e., among 
French-speaking African refugees) results in a larger payoff for refugees assigned to French-
speaking cantons than for those assigned to German-speaking cantons. 
Bansak et al. (2018) suggest that allocation of refugees to suitable locations is a way to 
improve refugee integration and should be given more attention by policy-makers. They 
propose the use of an algorithm that uses a combination of supervised machine learning and 
optimal matching to discover and leverage synergies between refugee characteristics and 
resettlement sites.37 They apply their algorithm to historical registry data from the United 
States and Switzerland, two countries with different assignment regimes and refugee 
populations. Their approach leads to gains of roughly 40 to 70%, on average, in refugees’ 
employment outcomes relative to current assignment practices. 
Closely related is the work of Couttenier et al. (2016) who study the role of public 
policies in reducing the criminality of asylum seekers in Switzerland. While their primary 
                                                 
36 See Edin et al. (2003) for the first convincing evidence from Sweden, exploiting the initial random 
assignment of refugees across Swedish municipalities on subsequent outcomes. 
37 Their data-driven approach differs from previous suggestions. Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport 
(2014, 2015) couple an auction mechanism for tradeable refugee quotas with a preference-matching algorithm 
that optimizes over refugees’ preferences for resettlement locations and locations’ preferences over refugee 
types. 
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result is that cohorts of asylum seekers that were exposed to civil conflicts/mass killings 
during childhood are more likely to engage in crime, this effect is neutralized in cantons 
where asylum seekers are allowed to rapidly search for paid employment and do not suffer 
salary deductions compared to locals. 
A fascinating new study by Bratsberg et al. (2018) links early experiences of forced 
migrants in Norway with their political integration, using quasi-exogenous variation in the 
placement of quota refugees to assess the consequences of assignment to particular 
neighbourhoods. The difference in electoral turnout between refugees initially placed in 20th 
and 80th percentile neighbourhoods (in terms of predicted turnout rate) is 12.6 percentage 
points, which is 47 percent of the observed gap between refugees and residents. They explain 
their results by the importance of early exposure to politically engaged peer networks.38 
A special case of forced migration is the removal of indigenous populations around the 
world into reservations or similar types of segregated communities, e.g. also apartheid in 
South Africa. This form of forced migration often went hand-in-hand with discrimination and 
with a forced imposition of governance structures or institutional arrangements that were a 
bad fit for the historical norms and institutions of the affected people (see Dippel, 2014, and 
the related literature cited therein).  
V. The Decision to Migrate under Threats39 
While the research on war-time expulsions generally argues that migrants had no choice 
but to leave their home regions, the literature on civil wars and on violence in poor countries 
is often concerned with the decision to migrate. Modelling the factors influencing migration 
flows is of course a classical issue in the migration literature going back nearly 150 years 
(Ravenstein, 1885). 
But while the two extremes of completely voluntary and forced migration mark two ends 
of a spectrum, where the former typically ignores physical threats, and the latter considers 
force the determining factor, the development literature adds physical threats to one’s life as 
an additional factor in countries afflicted by crime and civil wars. Since not all individuals in 
localities affected by civil war do migrate, Engel and Ibañez (2007) and Ibañez and Velez 
(2008) explicitly model migration as a choice in the face of actual and perceived threats. The 
                                                 
38 Another study concerned with the link between forced migration and voting behaviour of migrants is 
Arbatli and Gomtsyan (2018). They show that Armenians, whose ancestors fled with the help of the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation (ARF) from the genocide in the Ottoman Empire (1915-17), are nowadays more 
likely to vote for the ARF and to name their children after ARF rebels. 
39 Papers in this section are summarized in Table 4. 
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most likely victims of direct threats are small landowners, families with young household 
heads, and female-headed households, who as a result are also more likely to leave. 
While links between actual or perceived levels of violence and migration are well-
documented for internal migrations, researchers have started to study the effect of crime on 
international migration only recently. The reason is that one needs subnational data on region 
of origin and corresponding crime data to convincingly link migration flows to violence at 
origin. 
Two recent working papers show a link between regional levels of violence and 
international migration. Shrestha (2017) looks at push and pull factors for emigration from 
Nepal, using a panel of towns in Nepal. Conditional on pull factors, an increase in the death 
rate of 100 (per 100,000 population) due to Maoist insurgency in urban areas raises the rate 
of emigration to India, Malaysia, and the Gulf by 0.8 percentage points. 
Clemens (2017), looking at child migrants to the U.S. from Honduras, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala, shows that high rates of regional violence are a main driver of those flows. Using 
individual-level, anonymized data on all 178,825 U.S. apprehensions of unaccompanied child 
migrants from these countries between 2011 and 2016, he finds that one additional homicide 
per year in the region, sustained over the whole period – that is, a cumulative total of six 
additional homicides – caused a cumulative total of 3.7 additional unaccompanied child 
apprehensions in the United States. 
Both papers indicate that violence is an important factor not only in internal migration in 
countries afflicted by civil war, but also a factor driving international migration. 
The lesson for researchers is twofold: first, there is a spectrum between perfectly 
voluntary migration and forced migration and every context deserves careful attention to 
where on that spectrum a migration episode is located. Second, in intermediate cases where 
migration – while not voluntary – is also not universal, understanding the factors that drive 
selective migration are an important area of research.40 
VI. Summary and directions for future research 
Forced migration has received increased attention over the past decade. Two trends 
emerged: first, research has focused on mass expulsions as a result of major wars, in 
particular after WWII, and the end of colonial rule, e.g. the population exchanges in India and 
                                                 
40 Adam Smith considered poverty and unemployment as push factors for migration (see Rauhut, 2010). 
While this is typically considered as “economic” migration, it is arguably an intermediate case between fully 
voluntary and forced migration. 
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Pakistan after 1947. Second, forced migration as a consequence of natural disasters has led to 
new insights. While migration for economic reasons follows cost-benefit considerations, 
migration driven by expulsions and natural disasters is usually universal and leaves 
individuals barely any choice other than to leave.  
In parallel, research on forced migration resulting from civil wars in developing 
countries, much of which is surveyed by Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2013), has continued at 
pace. In this context, migration is often not universal, as perceived threats by warring factions 
vary across individuals, some of whom move while others stay. Still, migration under these 
circumstances is forced in the sense that the counterfactual outcomes are continued perceived 
or actual threats. 
Common findings are that mass expulsion poses a challenge for migrants and receiving 
populations alike. Migrants often take several generations to fully catch up with the receiving 
population. One notable exception is the Polish case where forced migrants expelled from 
Poland’s Eastern borderlands were resettled in largely empty territory left by Germans. Here, 
the experience of a loss in physical assets in combination with unhindered access to 
schooling led forced migrants to overtake other Poles in their education within the first 
generation. Becker et al. (2018) interpret this finding as confirmation of the uprootedness 
hypothesis popular among historians, but not rigorously empirically tested before. In other 
contexts, forced migrants find it challenging to compete with incumbent locals. Oftentimes 
refugees are not allowed to work for a certain time. 
Refugee inflows appear to have limited negative consequences for the host population in 
the labour market. Depending on the organization of the local economy with respect to job 
opportunities for forced migrants, the sectoral composition, and the size of the informal 
sector, the inflow of cheap labour can even be complementary to the existing workforce and 
increase productivity. Social tension can arise when the rise in productivity does not keep up 
with the increase in demand for goods and services. This is true for food markets and also 
other markets that are slower to adjust to new equilibria, such as housing and real estate. 
Even when forced migrants neither positively nor negatively impact prices, consumption, or 
the labour market outcomes of the host population, the political implications can be varied as 
shown by the cases of Denmark and Greece. 
The literature surveyed has made a lot of progress in studying the consequences of 
forced migration on receiving populations, as well as on migrants themselves. The latter 
usually is discussed with an interest in “integration” of forced migrants. What has received 
less attention is the effect of forced migration on sending areas. While expulsion of Jews 
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from office in Germany and the Holocaust have been subject of quite some research, in many 
other cases the research on consequences of forced migration on receiving populations is not 
matched by a corresponding study of the effects of the same episode on the sending area. For 
instance, rigorous empirical analysis of the effect of forced Huguenot immigration from 
France to Prussia by Hornung (2014) is not matched by equally rigorous research on the 
effect of expulsion of Huguenots on French regions. The strand of the literature studying the 
outcomes of stayers in the sending economy has focused on education and economic 
performance at the aggregate level. Expulsions, however, provide many more changes that 
can be exploited. This includes the reduction in ethnic or religious diversity, or group-specific 
wealth and knowledge concentration which can further affect stayers in terms of economic 
but also social outcomes. 
The effects of forced migration on stayers have also mainly been studied for cases of 
state-mandated expulsion that were near universal. The main challenge when estimating the 
effects of civil wars or natural disasters is to isolate the impact of forced migration from the 
direct effects of the shock on stayers’ outcomes. Improving our current knowledge in this 
area would have important policy implications. 
An aspect of forced migration that has received little attention is the potential for forced 
migration to change migrants’ preferences.41 Here, the fact that forced migrants are exposed 
to a sudden loss of their homes and an exogenous move to a new location allows researchers 
to shed new light on the role of preferences. This may have important consequences for our 
understanding of the integration (or not) of forced migrants. While physical and 
psychological factors may hamper integration, a shift in preferences towards human capital 
can have payoffs not enjoyed by voluntary migrants. We urge researchers working on forced 
migration to seriously consider insights from neighbouring disciplines, such as medicine, 
psychology and sociology to gain a deeper understanding into changes in economic 
behaviour. 
Another potentially interesting aspect on which there seems little research is location 
“choice” of forced migrants. While voluntary migrants optimize their location choice, forced 
migrants may end up in a sub-optimal location, depending on how free they are to choose 
                                                 
41 We are aware of the Stigler/Becker (1977) argument that preference shifts can be accommodated in a 
framework of stable (generalized) preferences where past experiences affect shadow prices and thereby choices, 
but we will for simplicity refer to preference shifts, in line with the vast literature on endogenous preferences 
(e.g. the survey by Bowles, 1998) and consistent with the insights of behavioural economics (see Fehr and Hoff, 
2011). See also Jakiela and Ozier (2018) for recent evidence on preference shifts resulting from violence after 
Kenya’s 2007 post-election crisis. 
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locations. For instance, Syrian refugees can be found in many different countries: Turkey, 
Lebanon, Germany etc. Who goes where? Within a receiving country, refugees may be 
allocated to specific destinations without much choice. While the random assignment of 
refugees to locations has received some attention (e.g. Bansak et al., 2018), there is room for 
more research in this important area. Somewhat related is the question of how moving in 
groups of forced migrants affects location choice and assimilation at destination. While 
network aspects have been considered, the focus is typically on existing networks at 
destination. An aspect specific to mass migrations (both forced and voluntary) is the 
experience of moving together with many others. 
We also hope to see more research in the future that combines information on migrants 
with contextual variables at both location of origin and destination. Only few studies we have 
surveyed consider this so far. Many studies looking at mass expulsions just treat forced 
migrants as coming from a macro region or country without regard for heterogeneity with 
respect to urban or rural origin, or different geographic or political conditions within the 
region/country of origin that can yield additional insights into the difficulty or ease of forced 
migrants to assimilate at their destination. 
In summary, we expect a lot of exciting new research in the years to come that covers 
additional episodes of forced migration, using both historical and contemporary data. 
Unfortunately, forced migration is likely to be an experience shared by many also in the 
future. Even if conflict intensities around the world should decline (a big if!), climate change 
is likely to lead to forced migration as a result of rising sea levels and natural catastrophes.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Consequences of Forced Migration for Receiving Populations 
Author Origin Destination Period Event Result 
Akgündüz, Y.E., van den 
Berg, M., and Hassink, W. 
(2018) 
Syria Turkey 
2012 - 
2014 
Syrian Civil War 
firm entry (0), foreign-owned firms (+), 
gross profits (+) net sales (+) 
Altindag, O., Bakis, O., and 
Rozo, S. (2018) 
Syria Turkey 
2012 - 
2014 
Syrian Civil War firm creation (+), production (+) 
Alix-Garcia, J. and Bartlett, 
A. (2015) 
Darfur (Sudan) 
mostly within 
Sudan 
2003 - 
2009 
Darfur Conflict 
native unemployment (-), native high-skill 
sector employment (+); refugee 
unemployment (+); short-term wealth for 
low-skilled natives (-), demand for goods (+) 
Alix-Garcia, J. and Saah, D. 
(2009) 
Burundi, Rwanda Tanzania 
1993 - 
1994 
1993 coup in Burundi, 
1994 genocide in 
Rwanda 
prices in goods markets close to refugee 
camps (+), rural natives’ wealth (+), urban 
natives’ wealth (-) 
Alix-Garcia, J., Bartlett, A., 
and Saah, D. (2011) 
Darfur (Sudan) 
mostly within 
Sudan 
2003 - 
2009 
Darfur Conflict 
food prices (+), housing prices (+), new 
businesses (+) 
Alix-Garcia, J., Bartlett, A., 
and Saah, D. (2013) 
Darfur (Sudan) 
mostly within 
Sudan 
2003 - 
2009 
Darfur Conflict 
abandonment of land in rural areas (+), 
intensive land-use at the periphery of cities 
(+) 
Alix-Garcia, J., Walker, S., 
Bartlett, A., Onder, H., and 
Sanghi, A. (2018) 
Sudan, Somalia Kenya 
1991 
onward 
multiple 
demand for agricultural and livestock 
products (+), economic activity (+), 
consumption in host communities (+) 
 2 
Table 1 - continued 
Author Origin Destination Period Event Result 
Alix-Garcia, J., Walker, S., 
and Bartlett, A. (2018) 
Sudan, Somalia Kenya 2015 multiple 
reduction in remittances affects consumption 
of refugees (-), local communities (-) 
 
Baez, J. (2011) Burundi, Rwanda Tanzania 
1993 - 
1994 
1993 coup in Burundi, 
1994 genocide in 
Rwanda 
mortality (+), infectious diseases (+), body 
height (-), education (-), literacy (-) for 
children 
Balkan, B. and Tumen, S. 
(2016) 
Syria Turkey 
2012 - 
2014 
Syrian Civil War 
consumer prices (-), refugee labour supply in 
informal sector (+) 
Balkan, B., Tok, E.O., Torun, 
H., Tumen, S. (2018) 
Syria Turkey 
2012 - 
2014 
Syrian Civil War 
house prices (+), native demand for higher 
quality houses (+), crime rates (0) 
Blum, A., Jarotschkin, A., 
and Zhuravskaya, E. (2018) 
Soviet Union Soviet Union 
1939 - 
1944 
Stalin's ethic 
deportations during 
WWII 
gender equality (+) stronger in areas with 
Protestant (German) deportees than in areas 
with Muslim deportees (from the North 
Caucasus) 
Braun, S. and Dwenger, N. 
(2017) 
Eastern Europe 
(mostly ex-German 
territories) 
(West) Germany 
1944 - 
1946 
Expulsion of Germans 
after WWII 
host-refugee differences affect intermarriage 
(-), support for anti-refugee party (+), 
refugee labour market outcomes (0) 
Braun, S. and Kvasnicka, M. 
(2014) 
Eastern Europe 
(mostly ex-German 
territories) 
(West) Germany 
1944 - 
1946 
Expulsion of Germans 
after WWII 
share in production from agriculture (-), 
non-agricultural sectors (+) 
Braun, S. and Mahmoud, T. 
(2014) 
Eastern Europe 
(mostly ex-German 
territories) 
(West) Germany 
1944 - 
1946 
Expulsion of Germans 
 
native employment (-) 
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Table 1 - continued 
Author Origin Destination Period Event Result 
Calderón-Mejía, V. and 
Ibáñez, A.M. (2016) 
Colombia internal 
1998 - 
2013 
internal conflict 
wages (-) esp. for low-skilled and in 
informal sector 
 
Chevalier, A., Elsner, B., 
Lichter, A., and Pestel, N. 
(2018) 
Eastern Europe 
(mostly ex-German 
territories) 
(West) Germany 
1944 - 
1946 
Expulsion of Germans 
after WWII 
taxes for farms and businesses (+), spending 
on infrastructure (-), housing (-), welfare (+), 
political activity by refugees (+) 
Depetris-Chauvin, E. and 
Santos, R.J. (2018) 
Colombia internal 
1960s - 
2008 
internal conflict 
rental prices for low-income homes (+) and 
high-income homes (-), homicide rates (+) 
Dinas, E., Hangartner, M., 
Matakos, K., and Xefteris, D. 
(2018) 
Syria Greece 
since 
2011 
Syrian Civil War support for Greek right-wing party (+) 
Dippel, C. and Heblich, S. 
(2018) 
Germany USA 1848 
Failed democratic 
revolution 1848-49 
receiving a German democrat refugee leads 
to volunteering in Union Army (+), 
desertion rates (-) 
Dustmann, C., Vasiljeva, K., 
and Damm, A.P. (2018) 
Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, 
Somalia, Sri Lanka, 
Vietnam, 
Afghanistan, and 
Ethiopia 
Denmark 
1986 - 
1998 
No specific event 
named 
vote share for anti-immigrant parties (+), left 
parties (-); opposite effect in very large cities 
Gehrsitz, M. and Ungerer, M. 
(2017) 
Syria Germany 
since 
2011 
Syrian Civil War 
employment (0), refugee employment (-), 
petty crime (+) 
Hangartner, D., Dinas, E., 
Marbach, M., Matakos, K., 
and Xefteris, D. (2018) 
Syria Greece 
since 
2011 
Syrian Civil War 
hostilities towards refugees (+), support for 
restrictive migration policies (+) 
 4 
Table 1 - continued 
Author Origin Destination Period Event Result 
Hornung, E. (2014) France 
Brandenburg-
Prussia 
1685 
Expulsion of 
Huguenots 
productivity of textile manufactories (+) 
 
 
Kofol, C. and Naghsh 
Nejad, M. (2018) 
Burundi (1993) and 
Rwanda (1994) 
Tanzania 1990s Hutu-Tutsi conflict 
child labour in short-run (-) and long-run 
(+), household income in short-run (+) and 
long-run (-), food prices (+) 
Kreibaum, M. (2018) 
Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Uganda 
1998 - 
2003 
Civil war following a 
coup 
consumption (+), public services (+), 
perception of own econ situation (0) 
Labanca, C. (2016) 
Egypt, Libya, 
Tunisia and Yemen 
Italy 2011 Arab Spring 
employment (0), by sector: construction 
(+), education (+), hospitality (-), mining (-
) 
Maystadt, J. and Werwimp, 
P. (2014) 
Burundi (1993) and 
Rwanda (1994) 
Tanzania 1990s Hutu-Tutsi conflict 
competition in agriculture labour markets 
(+) 
Maystadt, J.-F. and 
Duranton, G. (2018) 
Burundi (1993) and 
Rwanda (1994) 
Tanzania 1990s Hutu-Tutsi conflict 
welfare (+), consumption (+), investment in 
transportation network (+) 
Mirza, R.A. (2018) India Pakistan 
1947 - 
1951 
Partition of 
India/Pakistan 
urbanization (+), literacy (+) 
Morales, J.S. (2018) Colombia internal 
1960s - 
2008 
internal conflict 
wages (-) in short-run, wages in long-run 
for men (0) and women (-), native 
outmigration (+) 
 
Moser et al. (2014) Germany USA 
1933 - 
1945 
Removal of Jews 
from civil service 
before the holocaust 
patenting (+), new patentees in affected 
patent field (+) 
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Table 1 - continued 
Author Origin Destination Period Event Result 
Murard, E. and Sakalli, S. 
(2018) 
Turkey Greece 1922 
After the Greco-
Turkish war of 1919–
1922 
modern earnings (+), household wealth (+), 
education (+), size of financial and 
manufacturing sector (+) 
Peters, M. (2017) 
Eastern Europe 
(mostly ex-German 
territories) 
(West) Germany 
1944 - 
1946 
Expulsion of Germans 
after WWII from 
Middle and Eastern 
Europe 
per capita incomes (+), manufacturing 
employment (+), new plant entries (+) 
Ruiz, I. and Vargas-Silva, C. 
(2015) 
Burundi (1993) and 
Rwanda (1994) 
 Tanzania 1990s Hutu-Tutsi conflict 
probability of working in government or 
professional occupations (+) 
Ruiz, I. and Vargas-Silva, C. 
(2016) 
Burundi (1993) and 
Rwanda (1994) 
Tanzania 1990s Hutu-Tutsi conflict employment (-), household work (+) 
Sarvimäki, M. (2011) South-East Finland 
South-West 
Finland 
1940 - 
1944 
Soviet invasion 
population growth (+), industrialization (+), 
wages (+) 
Schumann, A. (2014) 
Eastern Europe 
(mostly ex-German 
territories) 
(West) Germany 
1944 - 
1946 
Expulsion of Germans 
population (+), economic activity: industry 
employment (+), firms (+) 
Tumen, S. (2016) Syria Turkey 
2012 - 
2014 
Syrian Civil War 
informal employment (-), long-term 
unemployment (+), wages (0) 
Tumen, S. (2018) Syria Turkey 
2012 - 
2014 
Syrian Civil War high-school enrolment (+) 
Note: Unless otherwise specified, outcomes are expressed as effects of an influx of forced migrants on the native population. Effect directions are denoted 
as: (+) positive effect, (-) negative effect, (0) zero effect. 
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Table 2: Consequences of Forced Migration for Sending Populations 
Author Origin Destination Period Event Result 
Acemoglu, D., Hassan, 
T.A., and Robinson, J.A. 
(2011) 
Soviet Union NA 
1941 - 
1945 
Expulsion and 
murder of Jews 
by the Nazis 
during WWII 
population (-), per capita income and wages 
(-), vote share for Communist party in post-
Soviet era (+) 
 
Akbulut-Yuksel, M. and 
Yuksel, M. (2015) 
Germany NA 
1933 - 
1945 
Removal of Jews 
from civil service 
before expulsion 
and mass murder 
began 
years of education (-), prob. of finishing 
school (-), prob. of going to college (-) 
Arbatli, C.E. and Gokmen, 
G. (2017) 
Turkey 
Greece, Armenia 
and various 
other countries 
Armenians: 
1915-17 
 Greeks: 
1919-23  
Expulsion of 
Greeks and 
Armenians 
modern outcomes in 2000: population 
density (+), urbanization (+), nightlight 
intensity (+) 
Bahar, D., Hauptmann, A., 
Özgüzel, C., and Rapoport, 
H. (2018) 
Yugoslavia Germany 1991-95 
Breakup of 
Yugoslavia 
return migration affected exports in 
receiving product categories (+) 
Beine, M. and Parsons, C. 
(2015) 
multiple multiple 
1960 - 
2000 
climate 
anomalies 
natural disasters/rainfall shocks in sending 
econ.: bilateral migration flows (+) 
Bharadwaj, P., Khwaja, A. 
I., and Mian, A. (2015) 
India/Pakistan India/Pakistan 
1947 - 
1951 
Indian Partition 
 
literacy (-), but literacy (+) if Indian refugees 
received from Pakistan 
 7 
Table 2 - continued 
Author Origin Destination Period Event Result 
Cattaneo, C. and Peri, G. 
(2016) 
multiple multiple 
1960 - 
2000 
climate 
anomalies 
temperature incr. in sending econ.: migration 
and urbanization in middle-income countries 
(+) and low-income countries (0) 
Engel, S. and Ibañez, A. M. 
(2007) 
Colombia internal 
around 
2000 
civil conflict 
incr. in violence in sending econ.: migration 
(+) 
Grosfeld, I., Rodnyansky, 
A., and Zhuravskaya, E. 
(2013) 
Soviet Union NA 
1941 - 
1945 
Expulsion and 
murder of Jews 
by the Nazis 
during WWII 
entrepreneurship (-), support for liberal 
market policy (-) and democracy (-), trust 
(+), consumption (0), income (0), education 
(0) 
Huber, K., Lindenthal, V., 
and Waldinger, F. (2018) 
Germany NA 
1933 - 
1938 
Removal of Jews 
from civil service 
and other 
positions of 
leadership 
quality of senior management (-), firm stock 
price (-), return to assets (-) 
Marchiori, L., Maystady, J.-
F., and Schumacher, I. 
(2012) 
multiple NA 
1960 - 
2000 
multiple 
rain and temperature shocks in sending 
econ.: migration (+), urbanization (+) 
Pascali, L. (2016) 
Italian 
municipalities 
NA 
1470 - 
1570 
none specifically 
modern outcomes: bank branch density (-), 
availability of credit (-), incomes (-) 
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Table 2 - continued 
Author Origin Destination Period Event Result 
Testa, P.A. (2018) Czech borderlands mostly Germany 
1945 - 
1947 
Expulsion of 
Germans after 
WWII 
modern outcomes: population density (-), 
unemployment rates (+), skill-intensive 
industry (-), education (-) 
Waldinger, F. (2010) Germany NA 
1933 - 
1945 
Removal of Jews 
from civil service 
before expulsion 
and mass murder 
began 
faculty quality (-), publications of PhDs (-), 
prob. of becoming full professor (-), lifetime 
citations (-) 
Waldinger, F. (2012) Germany NA 
1933 - 
1945 
Removal of Jews 
from civil service 
before expulsion 
and mass murder 
began 
productivity due to peer effect (0) 
Note: Unless otherwise specified, outcomes are expressed as effects of an outflow of forced migrants on the economy or people of the sending area. Effect 
directions are denoted as: (+) positive effect, (-) negative effect, (0) zero effect. 
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Table 3: Consequences of Forced Migration for Migrants Themselves 
Author Origin Destination Period Event Result 
Arbatli, C.E. and Gomtsyan, 
D. (2018) 
Ottoman Empire Armenia 
1915 - 
1917 
Armenian 
Genocide 
votes for Armenian Revolutionary Federation 
(+), name children after ARF rebels (+) 
Bansak, K., Ferwerda, J., 
Hainmueller, J., Dillon, A., 
Hangartner, D., Lawrence, 
D., and Weinstein, J. (2018) 
French-speaking 
Africa 
Switzerland 
1999 - 
2013 
none specifically payoffs from relevant language skills (+) 
Bauer, T. K., Braun, S., and 
Kvasnicka, M. (2013) 
Eastern Europe 
(mostly ex-German 
territories) 
(West) Germany 
1944 - 
1946 
Expulsion of 
Germans 
econ outcomes of 1st gen (-), except displaced 
farmers: income (+) 
Bauer, T.K., Giesecke, M., 
and Janisch, L.M. (2017) 
Eastern Europe 
(mostly ex-German 
territories) 
(West) Germany 
1944 - 
1946 
Expulsion of 
Germans after 
WWII 
mortality risk after age 68 (+) 
Beaman, L.A. (2012) multiple USA 
2001 - 
2005 
Refugee 
resettlement 
econ outcomes relate to network members 
who arrive in the same year (-) and those who 
have already been established in the area 
before (+) 
Becker, S.O., Grosfeld, I., 
Grosjean, P., Voigtlaender, 
N., and Zhuravskaya, E. 
(2018) 
Central Poland and 
Eastern Territories 
(Kresy) 
Central Poland 
and Western 
Territories (ex-
German areas) 
1945 - 
1946 
Expulsion of Poles 
after WWII 
descendants of forced migrants: education 
(+), high school and higher ed completion (+), 
preferences for intangible assets (+) 
Bratsberg, B., Raaum, O., 
and Røed, K. (2014) 
multiple Norway 
1970 - 
2014 
none specifically 
diff to natives for migrants from high-inc 
countries (0), for low-inc countries: empl (-), 
participation in social programs (+) 
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Table 3 - continued 
Author Origin Destination Period Event Result 
Bratsberg, B., Raaum, O., 
and Røed, K. (2017) 
multiple Norway 
1970 - 
2014 
none specifically 
low-income country migrants’ employment 
(-), social insurance update (+) in long-run 
Bratsberg, B., Ferwerda, J., 
Finseraas, H., and 
Kotsadam, A. (2018) 
multiple Norway 
1990 - 
2012 
none specifically 
political participation of refugees settling in 
areas with politically active peers (+) 
Chyn, E. (2018) 
low income areas in 
Chicago 
other areas in 
Chicago 
1990s 
Demolitions of 
public housing 
employment (+), wages (+), education (+), 
crime (-) 
Cortes, K. E. (2004) multiple USA 
1975 - 
1980 
none specifically 
in 1980: employment (-), earnings (-). In 
1990: employment (+), earnings (+), English 
skills (+) 
Couttenier, M., Preotu, V., 
Rohner, D., and Thoenig, 
M. (2016) 
multiple Switzerland 
2009 -
2012 
none specifically 
experience of violence in home country: 
crime (+) but labour market access policies 
remove this effect 
Dagnelie, O., Mayda, A.M., 
and Maystadt, J.-F. (2018) 
multiple USA 
2005 - 
2010 
none specifically 
employment (+) if other refugees in network 
are employers, but (-) if they are also 
employees 
Deryugina, T., Kawano, L., 
and Levitt, S. (2018) 
New Orleans, USA 
other parts of the 
US 
2005 Hurricane Katrina 
income (-), employment (-) but small and 
temporary 
Dippel, C. (2014) USA 
other parts of the 
US 
1850 - 
1890 
Creation of Indian 
reservations 
incomes (-) 
Dustmann, C., Fasani, F., 
Frattini, T., Minale, L., and 
Schoenberg, U. (2017) 
several EU 
until 
2008 
none specifically employment (-) 
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Table 3 - continued 
Author Origin Destination Period Event Result 
Falck, O., Heblich, S., and 
Link, S. (2012) 
Eastern Europe 
(mostly ex-German 
territories) 
(West) Germany 
1944 - 
1946 
Expulsion of 
Germans after 
WWII 
effect on refugees from integration law (0) 
Groen, J.A. and Polivka, 
A.E. (2008) 
New Orleans, USA multiple 2005 Hurricane Katrina unemployment (+) but temporary 
Haukka, J., Suvisaari, J., 
Sarvimäki, M., and 
Martikainen, P. (2017) 
South-East Finland 
South-West 
Finland 
1940 - 
1944 
Soviet invasion 
prob. of dying from heart disease (+), suicide 
mortality (-) 
Lavy, V., Schlosser, A., and 
Shany, A. (2016) 
Ethiopia Israel 1991 
Evacuation of 
Jews from 
Ethiopia 
educational attainment (+) and educational 
equality (+) of children who spent more time 
in utero under Israeli healthcare 
Marbach, M., Hainmueller, 
J., and Hangartner, D. 
(2018) 
Yugoslavia Germany 
1991 - 
2001 
Yugoslav Wars 
reduction in waiting period to enter labour 
market: employment (+), integration (+) for 
affected group 
Nakamura, E., Sigurdsson, 
J., and Steinsson, J. (2018) 
Iceland (Westman 
Islands) 
other parts of 
Iceland 
1973 Volcanic eruption 
lifetime earnings (+) and education (+) if 
aged < 25, earnings (-) but small effect if 
aged >25 
Ruiz, I. and Vargas-Silva, 
C. (2018) 
several UK 
2010 - 
2017 
none specifically employment (-), earnings (-) 
Saarela, J. and Finnas, F. 
(2009) 
South-East Finland 
South-West 
Finland 
1940 - 
1944 
Soviet invasion 
mortality risk (+) due to Perestroika for 
Finns displaced during WWII 
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Table 3 - continued 
Author Origin Destination Period Event Result 
Sacerdote, B. (2012) New Orleans 
Louisiana and 
neighbouring 
states 
2005 
Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita 
school test scores (-), dissipates over time 
Sarvimäki, M., Uusitalo, R., 
and Jäntti, M. (2018) 
South-East Finland 
South-West 
Finland 
1940 - 
1944 
Soviet invasion 
prob. of non-agriculture job for former 
farmers (+), earnings (+) 
 Note: Unless otherwise specified, outcomes are expressed as effects of migration on the forced migrants themselves. Effect directions are denoted as: (+) 
positive effect, (-) negative effect, (0) zero effect. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: The Decision to Migrate under Threats 
Author Origin Destination Period Event Result 
Clemens, M. (2017) 
Honduras, El 
Salvador, Guatemala 
USA 2011 - 2016 
Emigration from 
home countries due 
to violence 
homicides in sending econ.: unaccompanied 
migrant children to U.S. (+) 
Ibañez, A. M. and Velez, C. 
E. (2008) 
Colombia internal 
around 
2000 
civil conflict welfare loss from displacement (+) 
Shrestha, M. (2017) Nepal 
India, Malaysia, 
and the Gulf 
2000s Maoist insurgency 
incr. death rate due to Maoist insurgency: 
emigration (+) 
 Note: Effect directions are denoted as: (+) positive effect, (-) negative effect, (0) zero effect. 
